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Abstract: In an effort to strengthen bank liquidity-risk management practices, the Basel Committee proposed 
new liquidity requirements for banks in 2010 under the Basel III framework. However, despite the good 
intentions of the liquidity requirements the new regulations are likely to present some challenges for banks 
in the course of managing their liquidity. However, before any inference can be made about the possible 
implications of the liquidity standards on bank liquidity management practices, it is imperative to have 
insight into the current liquidity management strategies of banks. This paper seeks to determine the current 
liquidity management practices of banks in South Africa by examining whether South African banks have 
target liquidity levels which they pursue and also by determining the variables that drive bank liquidity 
ratios. The study sample comprised six commercial banks operating in South Africa over the period 1993 to 
2009. For analysis, a partial adjustment model was developed and estimated using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator. The rate at which South African banks adjust their balance sheets was estimated 
at 8%. This adjustment speed implies that South African banks adjust their balance sheets slowly – probably 
due to high adjustment costs. Thus, South African listed banks have passively managed their liquidity and 
partially adjust their liquidity levels in an attempt to reach the optimal level. Furthermore, the following 
variables were considered to be the main drivers of liquidity ratios in South Africa: bank size, capital 
adequacy, loan loss reserves, and financial crisis. 
 




During the global financial turmoil that began in mid2007, many banks experienced liquidity problems. Bank 
liquidity problems reached a climax in late 2008, following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. Farag et al. (2013) and Vodová (2013) attributed liquidity problems that banks faced to imprudent 
liquidity-management practices. The fact that liquidity was easily, cheaply and readily available, made banks 
complacent in terms of their liquidity management (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). 
Similarly, Accenture (2015) observed that banks did not develop proper liquidity projection models and over 
relied on volatile short-term wholesale funds like Repurchase Agreements (Repos) and Asset Backed 
Commercial Paper (ABCP) to finance their activities. At the same time, banks invested heavily in structured 
products like Asset Backed Securities (ABS) which are vulnerable to illiquidity during episodes of severe 
financial distress such as occurred during the 2007 to 2009 financial turmoil (Kowalik, 2013). Bank liquidity 
can be described as the dexterity of a bank in funding asset growth and paying off obligations as they fall due 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008). Liquidity is vital to the ongoing viability of a bank; 
therefore, liquidity management ought to be a routine activity in bank operations. Liquidity management is 
not only important at individual bank level, because liquidity shortfalls are contagious (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2000). A shortfall at one bank (especially systemically important banks) can quickly 
transcend to other banks – causing system-wide disturbances.  
 
The need for banks to efficiently manage their liquidity stems from their maturity-transformation function in 
the economy. Typically, banks accept short-term deposits from surplus economic units and issue long-term 
loans to deficit economic units. Banks engage in maturity transformation on the assumption that depositors 
will not make ‘enmasse’ withdrawals (Elliot, 2014)– or that they can easily replenish withdrawals with new 
deposits. However, during periods of financial crisis, depositors can lose confidence in a bank or the banking 
system as a whole (due to solvency concerns), and engage in panic withdraws (Covas and Driscoll, 2014). 
Under these circumstances, if the troubled institution(s) do not have adequate liquidity buffers or fail to get 
external support timeously, they are likely to experience “bank runs” and failure becomes inevitable (Vodová, 
2013). Thus, liquidity management remains one of the most important occupation of bank managers (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000).  
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Liquidity management is connected to both sides of a bank’s balance sheet. It looks at the optimal mix of 
assets and liabilities that a bank needs to hold on an ongoing basis in order to remain liquid. Banks can 
ameliorate liquidity risk by financing themselves with fairly stable funding sources (mainly retail deposits) 
that are resilient – even during episodes of market-wide stress. Furthermore, banks can build liquidity 
buffers during good times, which they draw down during episodes of crisis – especially when the bank cannot 
renew its funding sources or when other assets are illiquid (Farag et al., 2013). Besides stable funding 
sources, bank managers can mitigate liquidity risk by holding a large stock of liquid assets such as treasury 
bills, central bank reserves, quasi-government securities, sovereign bonds, and non-financial corporate 
bonds. These securities can be liquidated when the need arises in order to cover liquidity shortfalls. Despite 
acting as a cushion against liquidity shortages, liquidity buffers however have a signaling effect. A bank with a 
large stock of liquid assets signals its ability to pay off imminent liabilities to the market (Aspachs et al., 
2005). For this reason, liquidity buffers build depositor confidence in the institution, which prevents panic 
withdrawals and ultimately reduces demand for withdrawals. Banks can also make use of the interbank 
market to meet their liquidity needs on a daily basis. However, this source of liquidity can be unreliable 
because it is susceptible to systemic disturbances and can even dry up – as occurred during the 2007 to 2009 
financial crisis.  
 
In an effort to strengthen bank liquidity-risk management practices, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision proposed new liquidity requirements for banks in 2010 under the Basel III framework – in the 
form of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The two rules have 
different but complementary objectives. The LCR aims to promote a bank’s short-term resilience in terms of 
liquidity shocks – by demanding that it holds adequate, high quality liquid assets (HQLA). The NSFR seeks to 
minimize liquidity risk (asset and liability mismatches) by ensuring that banks finance their activities with 
long-term stable sources of funding (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Despite their 
significance, however, the new liquidity regulations are likely to present some challenges for banks in 
managing their liquidity – because banks have never before been exposed to binding liquidity charges.1 
 
Before any inference can be made about the possible implications of liquidity standards on bank liquidity-
management practices, it is imperative to have insight into the current liquidity-management strategies of 
banks. In this regard, DeYoung and Jang (2016) state that if banks actively manage their balance sheet 
liquidity, then blanket imposition binding of liquidity regulations would only have idiosyncratic effects on 
bank liquidity management. On the other hand, if banks passively manage their liquidity, then blanket 
imposition of mandatory liquidity charges would have systematic effects on bank balance-sheet liquidity 
management and their ability to extend credit. Therefore, this study sought to investigate liquidity 
management practices being pursued by South African banks. In particular, this paper examines whether 
South African banks actively or passively managed their balance sheet liquidity during the period under 
review. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
To gain insights into liquidity-management practices of banks, Schertler (2010)  examined how German 
banks manage their regulatory liquidity based on three stylized strategies: liquidity purchases, cash-flow 
matching, and accounting exchanges. Using a dynamic panel regression model on a quarterly dataset covering 
the period 2000 to 2008 on three types of banks in Germany – commercial, savings and cooperative – 
Schertler found that banks have diverse liquidity-management strategies which are based on their type. 
Commercial banks were found to depend more on capital (wholesale) markets for funding, while savings and 
cooperative banks concentrated on cash-flow matching – i.e. they match cash inflows and outflows between 
assets and liabilities in each time bucket, in order to manage their liquidity. All three forms of banks were 
found to engage in asset side accounting exchanges, and also cutting back lending when confronted with 
higher payment obligations from maturing obligations. De Haan and van den End (2013) examined how 
banks react to funding liquidity disturbances emanating from financial market volatility, using a dataset of 
the 17 largest Dutch banks for the period January 2004 to April 2010. They modeled bank liquidity dynamics 
using a panel Vector Autoregressive specification. Orthogonal impulse response showed that banks react to 
                                                          
1
Until 2010 there were no liquidity requirements for banks – only capital charges existed. 
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funding gaps in three stylized ways: (i) reducing lending, particularly wholesale; (ii) hoarding liquidity, 
mainly liquid bonds and central bank reserves; and (iii) engaging in fire sales, particularly equity. 
 
Duijm and Wierts (2014)applied the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator to examine the long-run 
relationship between actual and required liquidity for Dutch banks and evaluated bank balance sheet 
adjustment dynamics. They established a long-run relationship between liquid assets and liabilities, and 
therefore went on to develop an Error Correction Model (ECM) to identify how banks rebalance their balance 
sheets when confronted with liquidity shocks. The ECM shows that Dutch banks adjust their liquidity on the 
liability side – particularly when they are off their target liquidity level. Furthermore, the Dutch LCR (macro 
prudential regulation) was found to be weak in stemming aggregate liquidity cycles, as evidenced by 
procyclical trends in balance sheet size and risk-taking behavior of banks. DeYoung and Jang (2016) 
examined whether US commercial banks have target liquidity levels which they pursue, and how fast they 
adjusted their balance sheets to revert to their target liquidity ratios for the period 1992 and 2012. For 
analysis, they developed a partial adjustment model similar to that of Berger et al. (2008), and estimated the 
model using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) generalized method of moments estimator. DeYoung and Jang 




Empirical Model: The methodology of this paper is drawn from capital-management studies that explored 
bank capital-management practices. Accordingly, the researchers developed a partial adjustment model in 
line with Berger et al. (2008), Flannery and Hankins (2013) and (Kok and Schepens, 2013). Firstly, the 
researchers specify and estimate a model of the factors that influence banks’ target liquidity of the form: 
  𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡−1     (1) 
Where: 
LIQit* : is the target liquidity level for bank i at time t, which is perceived to vary across banks and over 
time. Bank liquidity level was proxied by the liquid asset ratio (LaR).  
β : is a vector of coefficients to be determined. 
Xi,t-1 : is a vector of bank specific characteristics that influence bank liquidity (see Table 1). 
 
The bank’s target liquidity is assumed to oscillate around an unobservable target. In each time period the 
bank looks at deviations from the target and takes appropriate action to close the gap. Due to adjustment 
costs, banks may not be able to instantly close the gap, so leading to the following partial adjustment model: 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡−1 = 𝜆 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (2) 
Where: 
λ : is the speed of adjustment. 
εit : is the error term 
 
If λ is high, it indicates that banks are actively managing their liquidity and face minimal adjustment costs. On 
the other hand, if λ is low, it means that banks are passively managing their liquidity and face substantial 
adjustment costs. 
 
Considering that the target liquidity is not directly observable, Equations (1) and(2) are integrated and 
rearranged to yield: 
 
  𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡−1 = 𝜆 𝛽𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡−1 +  1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (3) 
 
From equation (3), the complete model can be specified as: 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (4) 
 
Equation (4) enables us to estimate the bank’s target liquidity level, establish the cross-sectional bank-
specific variables that influence bank liquidity ratios, to estimate bank adjustment speed towards their 
desired liquidity level rate, and to investigate whether banks actively or passively manage their liquidity. 
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Equation (4) is estimated using system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998)– for the following reasons. As pointed out by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond 
(1998) and Roodman (2009), system GMM can eliminate autocorrelation arising from the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable among covariates, endogeneity problems emanating from the correlation of the 
one or more covariates with the error term, or omitted variable bias and unobserved heterogeneity due to 
differences in firm characteristics like management quality, organization culture, investment policies, and 
which static panel regression models like random effect, fixed effect and pooled ordinary least squares cannot 
handle. In addition, system GMM overcomes the weak instrument problem in the difference GMM estimator 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). System GMM estimator furthermore caters for biased adjustment speeds which 
arise in the dynamic structure of the model (Kok and Schepens, 2013). 
 
Data and Variables: The study sample was drawn from six commercial banks operating in South Africa over 
the period 1993 to 2009. The choice of commercial banks was based whether they were more involved in 
maturity transformation relative to other forms of banks. The study focuses on bank-specific drivers of 
liquidity. LikeMarozva (2015) and Molefe and Muzindutsi (2016), data for the study were sourced from the 
BFA McGregor database, because it is the most comprehensive database containing financial statements of 
firms (financial and non-financial) listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Based on Bonner and Hilbers 
(2015) and Delechat et al. (2012), bank-specific variables considered in this study were (see Table 1, below): 
 
Table 1: Bank-specific characteristics that influence the LDR 
Variable Description Measurement Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable  
Liquid asset 
ratio (LaR) 
Measure of bank liquidity that 
reflects the ability of the bank to 















Profitability measure: Profitable 
banks are expected to hold lower 
levels of liquidity, since they are 
perceived to have a low default 









Measures the soundness of a bank. 
Healthy banks are expected to hold 
lower liquidity because of their 









Illustrates the riskiness of the loan 
portfolio. The riskier the loan 
portfolio, the more liquid the bank is 







Big banks are expected to be less 
liquid because of their easy access to 
debt markets. 





Foreign banks, due to their access to 
external parent company support, 
are expected to hold low levels of 
liquidity. 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 for 
domestic ownership and 0 for foreign 
ownership. Foreign banks, because of 
their access to parent company 
support, are expected to hold lower 
levels of liquidity compared to their 





for local  
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FC Dummy variable to account for the 
financial crisis. It is presumed that 
financial crisis motivates banks to 
increase their liquidity buffers to 
mitigate liquidity risk which may 
arise from bank runs or large 
unexpected cash withdrawals. 
Dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 for the period of the crisis - i.e. 
2007 to 2009; otherwise the value is 0. 
Positive 
Source: Researchers’ own design. 
 
Unit root test: Before running regression models, Gujarati and Porter (1999) recommend that it is 
imperative to first check for unit roots in the data in order to prevent spurious regression. Accordingly, all the 
variables were tested for stationarity using the Maddala and Wu unit root test which is applicable to 
unbalanced panel data (Baltagi, 2005). The panel dataset employed in this paper is unbalanced due to some 
missing observations; thus, the Maddala and Wu test was regarded to be the most appropriate test.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Table 2 (below) presents estimates of descriptive statistics: 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
LaR 65.50423 16.5014 29.6275 85.5079 
NII 10.48168 19.92949 2.1346 83.6508 
LLR 88.81537 65.73206 35.0698 410.0575 
SIZE 11.76143 1.943447 6.074035 14.22341 
CAR 13.03774 13.40593 5 83.4 
Source: Model output. 
 
The average liquid asset ratio for the period under review was estimated at 65.50%, which is relatively high. 
This ratio means that for every R1.00 received by banks, R0.655 is maintained in liquid assets. This suggests 
that South African banks are very liquid and thus can withstand severe liquidity shocks. The average net 
interest income to earning assets ratio was estimated to be 10.48% for the period under review. This ratio 
implies that commercial banks in South Africa – for the period under investigation – have been able to earn 
10.48% from their earning assets. This indicates that South African banks are profitable and can efficiently 
‘sweat’ their capital. The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross advances was estimated to be 88.82%, which is 
fairly high, and indicates that South African banks are very conservative; they manage liquidity risk prudently 
by keeping a large buffer of provisions to cater for bad debts. Turning to capital adequacy, the average Tier 1 
ratio was 13.04%. This figure suggests that South African banks are adequately capitalized, considering that 




Table 3 presents results of pair correlation analysis. 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Variable  LaR LagLaR NII LLR SIZE CAR 
LaR 1.0000      
LagLaR 0.9124 1.0000     
NII -0.4826 -0.3807 1.0000    
LLR -0.2037 -0.2407 0.4419 1.0000   
SIZE 0.3503 0.3567 -0.5936 -0.0739 1.0000  
CAR -0.3892 -0.4798 -0.0143 -0.0213 -0.7133 1.0000 
Source: Model output. 
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From the correlation matrix (Table 3) it can be shown that data used for the study does not exhibit 
multicollinearity, because the correlation among independent variables is low; in all cases it is below 60% – 
save for the lagged dependent variable which is 91.24%. The high correlation of the lagged dependent 
variable with the regress and indicates persistence – that is to say past values of the dependent variable 
influence future values. Therefore, current values of the liquid asset ratios are heavily influenced by their past 
values. According to Gonzale et al. (2007) and Louzis and Vouldis (2015), if the dependent variable exhibits 
persistence, the best model to use for fitting the data will be a dynamic error component (partial adjustment) 
model. This justifies the adoption of a partial adjustment model in this paper. 
 
Unit Root Test Results: As shown in the Appendix, the results of the unit root test demonstrate that all the 
variables are stationary; hence, they can be regressed without problems of unit roots. All variables were 




Results of regressing equation 4 with system GMM are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Model results 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error p-value Significance 
level 
Constant 0.8023089 0.5478032 0.143 5% 
Lagged LaR 0.9223649 0.0469652 0.000 5% 
NII 0.0017551 0.0077879 0.822 5% 
LLR 0.0791261 0.0230416 0.001 5% 
SIZE -0.713565 0.4233576 0.427 10% 
CAR -0.022192 0.0279324 0.000 5% 
FC 0.0529322 0.021442 0.014 5% 
Ownership -0.0053233 0.0050777 0.294 5% 
Source: Model output. 
 
Lagged Dependent Variable: The coefficient of lagged LDR is positive and statistically significant at 5%. The 
significance of this variable implies that current values of liquidity ratios are influenced by their past values. 
In other words, these results demonstrate that liquidity ratios are persistent.  Therefore, the partial 
adjustment model used in this study is justified. The rate at which South African banks adjust their liquidity 
following a liquidity shock was estimated to be 0.077635, i.e. (1-0.92236). This adjustment speed is relatively 
low – implying that South African banks face high adjustment costs, since a low speed of adjustment is 
associated with high adjustment costs. Taken as a whole, the study established that South African listed banks 
have passively managed their liquidity and they partially adjust their liquidity levels in an attempt to reach 
the optimal level.  
 
Size: A priori, a negative relationship was expected between liquidity and firm size. To the expectation of 
researchers, results indicate a negative association (coefficient of -71.36%) between liquidity and bank size. 
Therefore, in the South African context, bank size can be considered to have a significant influence on the 
liquidity holdings of banks. Thus, the bigger the size of the bank, the less liquidity it maintains. These findings 
concur with DeYoung and Jang (2016) – who established that size positively influences the loan to deposit 
ratio in the United States. 
 
Net Interest Income: Contrary to researchers’ expectations, the coefficient for net interest income is 
positive, although statistically insignificant. The lower explanatory power of this variable suggests that 
profitability does not influence commercial banks in South Africa to hold liquidity buffers. Such findings can 
be explained by the fact that as an emerging market, South African banks are more tailored towards the 
traditional intermediation function of deposit collection and loan extension – with less reliance on debt 
funding. 
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Loan Loss Reserves: As predicted, the relationship between liquidity and loan loss reserves is positive and 
statistically significant. This confirms the hypothesis that banks hold more liquid assets to self-insure against 
potential defaults. Delechat et al. (2012) also established that banks which are perceived to be risky increase 
their loan loss reserves, which ultimately boosts their liquidity. 
 
Capital Adequacy Ratio: A negative statistically significant association between liquidity and capital 
adequacy was identified, as expected. This result can be explained by the fact that capital regulations 
motivate banks to hold low risk weight assets which are generally liquidity (Bonner and Hilbers, 2015). 
Furthermore, healthy institutions are expected to hold lower liquidity because of their favorable access to 
funding markets. However, these findings contradict Vodova (2013) who established that capital does not 
significantly influence the liquidity holdings of banks in the Visegrad Group. 
 
Financial Crisis: A significant, positive correlation was identified between liquidity and financial crisis. These 
findings imply that the recent global financial crisis significantly influenced commercial banks in South Africa 
to boost their level of liquidity – in order to manage liquidity risk which could emanate from bank runs or 
large unexpected cash withdrawals. Therefore, it can be argued that crisis periods induce banks to increase 
their liquidity holdings. Nevertheless, Vodova (2013) provides contradicting results, and found that the 
recent financial crisis did not significantly influence Visegrad banks to hold more liquid assets.  
 
Ownership Structure: Since 75% of banks used in the study are indigenous, a priori the researchers 
expected the relationship between liquidity and ownership to be positive. Nevertheless, our study indicates a 
weak, negative and statistically insignificant relationship between liquidity and ownership. From these 
findings it can be argued that ownership does not significantly influence the liquidity holdings of banks in 
South Africa – contrary to Delechat et al. (2012) who found that ownership positively influences banks to 
hold liquid assets in Central America. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The main aim of this study was to shed light on the current liquidity-management practices of banks in South 
Africa. This aim was achieved by examining whether South African banks have target liquidity ratios which 
they pursue and by establishing the main drivers of bank liquidity ratios. The study results indicate that bank 
size, capital adequacy, loan loss reserves and financial crisis significantly influence bank liquidity holdings. On 
the other hand, net interest income and ownership were found to have a low explanatory power relative to 
banks’ desire to hold liquidity. Turning to the adjustment speed, the rate at which South African banks adjust 
their balance sheets following a liquidity shock was estimated to be approximately 8%. This implies that the 
adjustment speed is relatively slow hence – and hence these banks face high adjustment costs. Consequently, 
South African commercial banks passively manage their liquidity. In other words due to high adjustment 
costs, these banks take time to revert to their target liquidity levels. Furthermore, liquidity ratios were 
persistent over time. Based on these findings, it can be suggested that a blanket imposition of mandatory 
liquidity charges in South Africa would have systematic effects on banks’ balance-sheet liquidity 
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